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Abstract
Online advertising platforms are thriving due to the customizable audiences they offer ad-
vertisers. However, recent studies show that advertisements can be discriminatory with respect
to the gender or race of the audience that sees the ad, and may inadvertently cross ethical
and/or legal boundaries. To prevent this, we propose a constrained ad auction framework that
maximizes the platforms revenue conditioned on ensuring that the audience seeing an adver-
tisers ad is distributed appropriately across sensitive types such as gender or race. Building
upon Myersons classic work, we first present an optimal auction mechanism for a large class of
fairness constraints. Finding the parameters of this optimal auction, however, turns out to be
a non-convex problem. We show that this non-convex problem can be reformulated as a more
structured non-convex problem with no saddle points or local-maxima; this allows us to develop
a gradient-descent-based algorithm to solve it. Our empirical results on the A1 Yahoo! dataset
demonstrate that our algorithm can obtain uniform coverage across different user types for each
advertiser at a minor loss to the revenue of the platform, and a small change to the size of the
audience each advertiser reaches.
∗The code for the simulations is available at https://github.com/AnayMehrotra/Fair-Online-Advertising.
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1 Introduction
Online advertisements are the main source of revenue for social-networking sites and search engines
such as Google [4]. Ad exchange platforms allow advertisers to select the target audience for their
ad by specifying desired user demographics, interests and browsing histories [20]. Every time a
user loads a webpage or enters a search term, bids are collected from relevant advertisers [27],
and an auction is conducted to determine which ad is shown, and how much the advertiser is
charged [35,49,55]. As it is not practical for advertisers to place individual bids for every user, the
advertiser instead gives some high-level preferences about their budget and target audience, and
the platform places bids on their behalf [28].
More formally, let there be n advertisers, and m types of users. Each advertiser i specifies their
target demographic, average bid, and budget to the platform, which then decides a distribution,
Pij , of bids of advertiser i ∈ [n] for user type j ∈ [m]. These distributions represent the value
of the user to the advertiser, and ensure that the advertiser only bids for users in their target
demographic, with the expected bid not exceeding the amount specified by the advertiser [21]. At
each time step, a user visits a web page (e.g., Facebook or Twitter), the user’s type j ∈ [m] is
observed, and a bid vi is drawn from Pij , for each advertiser i ∈ [n]. Receiving these bids as input,
the mechanism M decides an allocation x(v) and price p(v) for the advertisement slot. Several
Ad Exchanges including Google Ads [2] and Facebook Ads [1], use variants of second price auction
mechanism [40]1.
Overall, such targeted advertising leads to higher utilities for the advertisers who show content
to relevant audiences, for the users who view related advertisements, and for the platform which
can benefit from selling targeted advertisements [22, 23, 26, 54]. However, targeted advertising can
also lead to discriminatory practices. For instance, searches with “black-sounding” names were
much more likely to be shown ads suggestive of an arrest record [46]. Another study found that
women were shown fewer advertisements for high paying jobs than men with similar profiles [16].
In fact, recent experiments demonstrate that ads can be inadvertently discriminatory; [34] found
that STEM job ads, specifically designed to be unbiased by the advertisers, were shown to more
men than women across all major platforms (Facebook Ads, Google Ads, Instagram and Twitter).
On Facebook, a platform with 52% women [51] the advertisement was shown to 20% more men
than women. [3] find that this could be a result of competitive spillovers among advertisers, and is
neither a pure reflection of pre-existing cultural bias, nor a result of user input to the algorithm.
Such (likely inadvertent) discrimination has led to two recent cases filed against Facebook, which
will potentially lead to civil lawsuits alleging employment and housing discrimination [5,30,38,47].
To gain intuition on how inadvertent discrimination could happen, consider the setting in which
there are two advertisers with similar bids/budgets, but one advertiser specifically targets women
(which is allowed for certain types of ads, e.g., related to clothing), while the second advertiser
does not target based on gender (e.g., because they are advertising a job). The first advertiser
creates an imbalance on the platform by taking up ad slots for women and, as a consequence,
the second advertiser ends up advertising to disproportionately fewer women and is inadvertently
discriminatory. Currently, online advertising platforms have no mechanism to check this type of
discrimination. In fact, the only way around this would be for the advertiser to set up separate
campaigns for different user types and ensure that each campaign reached a similar number of the
sub-target audience. However, online platforms often reject such campaigns in the apprehension of
discriminatory practices [17,34].
1If the auction sells a single item, then Myerson’s mechanism [37] reduces to a second price auction mechanism
with a reserve price [31].
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Ad Exchange Platform
AdvertisersUser
Ad Exchange Platform
AdvertisersUser
(a) Only the first advertiser bids for this user.
Ad Exchange Platform
AdvertisersUser
Ad Exchange Platform
AdvertisersUser
(b) Both advertisers place bids for this user.
Figure 1: When a user visits the platform, the platform accepts bids from relevant advertisers, and
conducts an auction to decide the ad to be shown to the user. Different advertisers have different
target audiences and only bid for users in their target audience.
Ou Contributions
Our main contribution is an optimization-based framework which maximizes the revenue of the
platform subject to satisfying constraints that prevent the emergence of inadvertent discrimination
as described above. The constraints can be formulated as any one of a wide class of “group fairness”
constraints as presented in [11], which constrains the distribution of an ads audience across the
sensitive types to ensure proportionality across types as defined by the platform. The framework
allows for intersectionality, allowing constraints across multiple sensitive attributes (e.g., gender,
race, geography and economic class) and allows for restricting different advertisers to different
constraints.
Formally, building on Myerson’s seminal work [37], we characterize the truthful revenue-optimal
mechanism which satisfies the given constraints (Theorem 4.1). The user types, as defined by
their sensitive attributes, are taken as input along with the type-specific bid distributions for
each advertiser, and we assume that bids are drawn from these distributions independently. Our
mechanism is parameterized by constant “shifts” which it applies to bids for each advertiser-type
pair. Finding the parameters of this optimal mechanism, however, is a non-convex optimization
problem, both in the objective and the constraints. Towards solving this, we first propose a novel
reformulation of the objective as a composition of a convex function constrained on a polytope,
and an unconstrained non-convex function (Theorem 4.2). Interestingly, the non-convex function
is reasonably well behaved, with no saddle-points or local-maxima. This allows us to develop a
gradient descent based scheme (Algorithm 1) to solve the reformulated program, which under mild
assumptions has a fast convergence rate of O˜(1/ε2) (Theorem 4.3).
We evaluate our approach empirically by studying the effect of the constraints on the revenue of
the platform and the advertisers using the Yahoo! Search Marketing Advertising Bidding Data [53].
We find that our mechanism can obtain uniform coverage across different user types for each
advertiser while losing less than 5% of the revenue (Figure 3). Further, we observe that the
total-variation distance between the fair and unconstrained distributions of total advertisements
an advertiser shows on the platform is less than 0.05 (Figure 4).
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to give a framework to prevent inadvertent
discrimination in online ad auctions.
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2 Our Model
2.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide some key preliminaries. For a detailed discussion, we refer the reader to
the excellent treatises [31,39] on Mechanism design.
A mechanismM is defined by its allocation rule x : Rn → [0, 1]n, and its payment rule p : Rn →
Rn≥0. Truthful mechanisms are those in which revealing the true valuation is optimal for all bidders.
Further, the can be shown that the allocation rule x(b1, b2, . . . , bn), of any truthful mechanism must
be monotone in bi for all i ∈ [n]. [36] proved for any mechanismM there exists a truthful mechanism
τ(M) such that τ(M) offers the same revenue to the seller and the same utility to each bidder as
M. As such, we restrict ourselves to truthful mechanisms. Furthermore, it is a well known fact [39]
that for any truthful mechanism its payment rule p, is uniquely defined by its allocation rule x.
Hence, for any truthful mechanism our only concern is the allocation rule x.
Let P be the distribution of valuation of a bidder, pdf : R → R>0 be its probability density
function, and cdf : R→ [0, 1] be its cumulative density function, then we define the virtual valuation
φ : supp(P)→ R, as φ(v) := v−(1−cdf(v))(pdf(v))−1. We say P is regular if φ(v) is non-decreasing
in v. Likewise, we say P is strictly regular if φ(v) is strictly increasing in v.
Myerson’s Optimal Mechanism. Myerson’s mechanism is defined as the VCG mechanism [15,
29,52] where the virtual valuation φi, is submitted as the bid vi for each bidder i. If the valuations
vi, and therefore, the virtual valuations φi are independent, then for any truthful mechanism the
virtual surplus
∑
i∈[n] φixi(φi), is equal to the revenue in expectation over the bids. Since VCG
is surplus maximizing, if Myerson’s mechanism is truthful then it maximizes the revenue. It can
be shown that if the bids have a regular distribution, then Myerson’s mechanism is truthful, and
therefore, revenue maximizing.
Notation. Let φij ∈ R be the virtual valuation of advertiser i ∈ [n] for type j ∈ [m], fij : R→ R≥0
be its probability density function, and Fij : R → [0, 1] be its cumulative density function. We
denote the joint virtual valuation of all advertisers for type j by φj ∈ Rn, and its joint probability
density function by fj : Rn → R≥0. The types j ∈ [m] are distributed according to a known
distribution U . Finally, given a user of type j, let a mechanism’s allocation rule be xj : Rn → [0, 1]n.
2.2 Fairness Constraints
We would like to guarantee that advertisers have a fair coverage across user types. We do so by
placing constraints on the coverage of an advertiser. Formally, we define advertiser i’s coverage of
type j, qij , as the joint probability that advertiser i wins the auction and the user is of type j
qij(xj) := PrU [j]
∫
supp(φj)
xij(φj)dfj(φj), (Coverage, 1)
where xij(φj) is the i-th component of xj(φj). Then, we consider the proportional coverage of the
advertiser on each type. Given vectors `j , uj ∈ [0, 1]n ∀ j ∈ [m], we define (`, u)-fairness constraints
for each advertiser i and type j, as a lower bound `ij , and an upper bound uij , on the proportion of
users of type j the advertiser shows ads to, i.e., we impose the following constraints for all i ∈ [n]
and j ∈ [m]
`ij ≤ qij∑m
t=1 qit
≤ uij . ((`, u)-fairness constraints, 2)
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2.3 Discussion of Fairness Constraints
Returning to the example presented in the introduction, we can ensure that the advertiser shows
x% of total ads to women, by choosing a lower bound of x for this advertiser on women. More
generally, for m user types, moderately placed lower bounds and upper bounds (`ij ∼ 1/m and
uij ∼ 1/m), for some subset of advertisers, ensure this subset has a uniform coverage across all
types, while allowing other advertisers to target specific types.
Importantly, while ensuring fairness across multiple types our constraints allow for targeting
within any single type. This is vital as the advertiser may not derive the same utility from each
user, and could be willing to pay a higher amount for more relevant users in the same type. For
example, if the advertiser is displaying job ads, then a user already looking for job opportunities
may be of a higher value to the advertiser than one who is not.
For a detailed discussion on how such constraints can encapsulate other popular metrics, such
as statistical parity, we refer the reader to [8].
2.4 Optimization Problem
We would like to develop a mechanism which maximizes the revenue while satisfying the upper and
lower bound constraints in Eq. (2). Towards formally stating our problem, we define the revenue
of mechanism M, with an allocation rule xj : Rn → [0, 1]n for type j as
revM :=
∑
i∈[n], j∈[m]
PrU [j]
∫
supp(φj)
φijxij(φj)dfj(φj), (Revenue, 3)
where xij(φj) and φij are the i-th component of xj(φj) and φj respectively. Thus, we can express
our optimization problem with respect to functions x(·), or as an infinite dimensional optimization
problem as follows.
(Infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem). For all user types j ∈ [m], find the optimal
allocation rule xj(·) : Rn → [0, 1]n for
max
xij(·)≥0
revM(x1, x2, . . . , xm) (4)
s.t. qij(xj) ≥ `ij
m∑
t=1
qit(xt) ∀ j ∈ [m], i ∈ [n] (5)
qij(xj) ≤ uij
m∑
t=1
qit(xt) ∀ j ∈ [m], i ∈ [n] (6)
n∑
i=1
xij(φj) ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ [m], φj , (7)
where (5) encodes the lower bound constraints, (6) encodes the upper bound constraints, and (7)
ensures that only one ad is allocated.
In the above problem, we are looking for a collection of optimal continuous functions x?. To
be able to solve this problem, we need – in the least – a finite dimensional formulation of the fair
online advertisement problem.
3 Other Related Work
[18] consider a framework which selects an ad category (e.g., job or housing) every time a user
visits the platform. Given fair mechanisms for each category, they construct a fair composition of
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these mechanisms. However, they do not show how to design fair mechanisms for each category,
or study how the composition affects the platform’s ad revenue. Another related problem is to
design optimal mechanisms which satisfy contract constraints [7, 25, 41]; these constraints allocate
a minimum number of ad spots to advertisers with a contract, and are different from our constraints
which control the fraction of each sensitive type the ads are shown to.
Several prior works address the problems of polarization and algorithmic bias, including [10,24]
who control polarization in social-networks and personalized feeds, [42] who diversify personal feeds,
and [12] who create a diverse and balanced summary of a set of results. In addition, [6,13,44] study
fair ranking algorithms; these could be used to generate a balanced list of results on job platforms
and other search engines. While these works are related to our broad goal of controlling algorithmic
bias, their formulation is different since they do not involve a bidding mechanism. Therefore, their
solutions cannot be applied to our problem.
Finally, a framework approach to fairness constraints has shown to be effective in various other
applications such as classification [8,32,56], selection of representatives [9], and personalization [14].
4 Theoretical Results
Our first result is structural, and gives a characterization of the optimal solution x?, to the infinite-
dimensional fair advertising problem, in terms of a matrix α ∈ Rn×m, making it a finite-dimensional
optimization problem with respect to α.
Theorem 4.1. (Characterization of an optimal allocation rule). There exists an α =
{αj}j∈[m] ∈ Rn×m such that if for all j ∈ [m], Pj are strictly regular and independent, then the
set of allocation rules xj(·, αj) : Rn → [0, 1]n ∀ j ∈ [m], defined below, is optimal for the infinite-
dimensional fair advertising problem
xij(vj , αj) := I[ i ∈ argmax`∈[n](φ`j(v`j) + α`j) ]. (α-shifted mechanism, 8)
Where we randomly breaks ties if any (this is equivalent to the allocation rule of the VCG mecha-
nism).
We present the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Section 7.1. In the proof, we analyze the dual of
the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem. We reduce the dual problem to one lagrangian
variable, by fixing the lagrangian variables corresponding lower bound (5) and upper bound (6)
constraints to their optimal values. The resulting problem turns out to be the dual of the un-
constrained revenue maximizing problem, for which Myerson’s mechanism is the optimal solution.
We interpret the fixed lagrangian variables as shifting the original virtual valuations φij . It then
follows that for some shift α ∈ Rn×m, the α-shifted mechanism (8) is the optimal solution to the
infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem.
Now, our task is reduced from finding an optimal allocation rule, to finding an α characterizing
the optimal allocation rule. Towards this, let us define the revenue, revshift : Rn×m → R and
coverage qij : Rn×m → [0, 1] as functions of α
revshift(α) :=
∑
i∈[n]
j∈[m]
Pr
U
[j]
∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)
∏
k∈[n]\{i}
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy (Revenue α-shifted mechanism, 9)
qij(α) := PrU
[j]
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)
∏
k∈[n]\{i}
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy. (Coverage α-shifted mechanism, 10)
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These follow by observing that (8) selects the advertiser with the highest shifted virtual valuation,
and then using this allocation rule in Eq. (3) and Eq. (1) respectively. Depending on the nature of
the distribution, the gradients ∂revshift(α)/∂αi and ∂qij(α)/∂αi may not be monotone in α (e.g., consider
the exponential distribution). Therefore, in general neither is revshift(·) a concave, nor is qij(·) a
convex function of α (see Section B for a concrete example). Hence, this optimization problem is
non-convex both in its objective and in its constraints. We require further insights to solve the
problem efficiently.
Towards this, we observe that revenue is a concave function of q. Consider two optimal allocation
rules obtaining coverages q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1]n×m and revenues R1, R2 ∈ R respectively. If we use the
first with probability γ ∈ [0, 1], we achieve a coverage γq1 +(1−γ)q2 with revenue γR1 +(1−γ)R2.
Therefore, the optimal allocation rule achieving γq1 + (1−γ)q2 has a revenue of at least γR1 + (1−
γ)R2. This shows that for optimal allocation rules revenue is a concave function of the coverage q.
Let rev : [0, 1](n−1)×m → R, be the maximum revenue of the platform as a function of coverage
q.2 Consider the following two optimization problems.
(Optimal coverage problem). Find the optimal q ∈ [0, 1]n×m for,
max
q∈[0,1]n
rev(q) (11)
s.t. qij ≥ `ij
m∑
t=1
qit ∀ j ∈ [m], i ∈ [n] (12)
qij ≤ uij
m∑
t=1
qit ∀ j ∈ [m], i ∈ [n] (13)
n∑
i=1
qij ≤ PrU [j] ∀ j ∈ [m]. (14)
(Optimal shift problem). Given the target coverage δ∈ [0, 1]n×m, find the optimal α∈Rn×m for
min
α∈Rn×m
L(α) := ‖δ − q(α)‖2F . (15)
Our next result relates the solution of the above two problems with the infinite-dimensional fair
advertising problem.
Theorem 4.2. Given a solution q? ∈ [0, 1]n×m to the optimal coverage problem, the solution α?
to the optimal shift problem with δ = q?, defines an optimal α-shifted mechanism (8) for the
infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem.
Proof. For any j ∈ [m] adding the all 1 vector, 1n, to αj does not change the allocation rule in (8).
Thus, it suffices to show that for all δ ∈ [0, 1]n×m, there is a unique α with α1j = 0 ∀ j ∈ [m], such
that q(α) = δ.
We can show that for all δ ∈ [0, 1]n×m, there is at-least one α ∈ Rn×m such that q(α) = δ.
In fact, the greedy algorithm which increases all αij , where qij(α) < δij and i 6= 1, will find the
required α.
To prove it is unique consider distinct α, β ∈ Rn×m such that α1j = β1j = 0. We can show that
q(α) 6= q(β). In particular, that qi′j′(α) 6= qi′j′(β) for (i′, j′) = argmaxi∈[n], j∈[m] |αij − βij |. Now,
the uniqueness of α follows by contradiction.
2We drop qij for one i ∈ [n] and each j ∈ [m]. This is crucial to calculate ∇rev (see Remark 5.1). By some abuse
of notation we write rev(q) for q ∈ Rn×m instead of using q ∈ R(n−1)·m.
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The above theorem allows us to find the optimal α by solving the optimal coverage and optimal
shift problems. First, let us consider the optimal coverage problem. We already know that its
objective is concave. We can further observe that its constraints are linear in q, and in particular,
they define a constraint-polytope Q ⊆ [0, 1]n×m. Therefore, it is a convex program, and one
approach to solve it is to use gradient-based algorithms.
The problem is that we do not have access to ∇rev. The key idea is that if we let α = q−1(δ),
then we can calculate ∇rev(δ) by solving the following linear-system,
(Jq(α))
>∇rev(δ) = ∇revshift(α), (Gradient Oracle, 16)
where Jq(α) is the Jacobian of vec(q(α)) ∈ R(n−1)m 3, with respect to vec(α) ∈ R(n−1)m. It turns
out that Jq(α) is invertible for all α ∈ Rn×m(see Section 5.1), and therefore, the above linear-system
has an exact solution.
Now, let us consider the optimal shift problem. Its objective is non-convex (see Figure 8(b)).
∇L(α) is a linear combination of ∇qij(α) for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. Since Jq(α) is invertible, its
rows {∇qij(α)}, are linearly independent, and the gradient is never zero unless we are at the global
minimum where α = q−1(δ). This guarantees that the objective does not have a saddle-point or
local-maximum, and that any local-minimum is a global minimum. Using this we can develop an
efficient algorithm to solve the optimal coverage problem (Lemma 7.2).
This brings us to our main algorithmic result, which is an algorithm to find the optimal allocation
rule for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem.
Theorem 4.3. (An algorithm to solve the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem).
There is an algorithm (Algorithm 1) which outputs α ∈ Rn×m such that if assumptions (17), (18),
(19), and (20) are satisfied, the α-shifted mechanism (8) achieves a revenue ε-close to the optimal
for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem in
O˜
(
n7 logm
ε2
(µmaxρ)
2
(µminη)4
(L+ n2µ2max)
)
steps.
Where the arithmetic calculations in each step are bounded by calculating ∇rev once and O˜ hides
log factors in n, ρ, η, µmax, 1/ε and 1/µmin.
Roughly, the above algorithm has a convergence rate of O˜(1/ε2), under the assumptions which we
list below.
Assumptions
For all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and y1, y2 ∈ supp(fij)
1. . qij > η (η-coverage, 17)
2. .µmin ≤ fij(y1) ≤ µmax (Distributed distribution, 18)
3. .|fij(y1)− fij(y2)| < L|y1 − y2| (Lipschitz distribution, 19)
4. .
∣∣E[φij ]∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
zfij(z)dz
∣∣∣∣ < ρ. (Bounded bid, 20)
3vec(·) represents the vectorization operator.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm1(Q, G, L, η, µmax, µmin, ε)
Input: Constraint polytope Q ⊆ [0, 1]n×m, Lipschitz constant G > 0 of rev(·), Lipschitz constant
L > 0 of fij(·), minimum coverage η > 0, lower and upper bounds, µmin and µmax of fij(·), and a
constant ε > 0.
Output: Shifts α ∈ Rn×m for the optimal mechanism.
1: Initialize γ := ε/2G2, ξ := (Gγ)2, T = (
√
2G/ε)2
2: Compute q1 := projQ(q(0n×m))
3: Compute α1 := Algorithm2(qt, αt, ξ, L, η, µmax, µmin)
4: for t = 1,2,. . . ,T do
5: Compute Jq(αt)
6: Compute rev(qt) from Jq(αt)
>∇rev(qt) := ∇revshift(αt)
7: Update qt+1 := projQ(qt + γ∇rev(qt))
8: Update αt+1 := Algorithm2(qt, αt, ξ, L, η, µmax, µmin)
9: end for
10: return α
Assumption (17) guarantees that all advertisers have at least an η probability of winning on every
type, assumption (18) places lower and upper bounds on the probability density functions of the
φij , assumption (19) guarantees that the probability density functions of the φij are L-Lipschitz
continuous, and assumption (20) assumes that the expected φij is bounded.
We expect Assumptions (17) and (20) to hold in any real-world setting. We can drop the lower
bound in Assumption (18) by introducing “jumps” in α to avoid ranges where the measure of bids
is small. Removing assumption (19) would be an interesting direction for future work.
Remark 4.4. We inherit the assumption of independent and regular distributions from Myerson.
In addition, we require the the distributions of valuations are strictly regular to guarantee that ties
between advertisers happen with 0 probability. We can drop this assumption by incorporating a
randomized tie-breaking rule which retains fairness. The above allocation rule is monotone and
allocates the ad spot to the bidder with the highest shifted valuation φij + αij for a given user.
Thus, it defines a unique truthful mechanism and corresponding payment rule.
5 Our Algorithm
Algorithm 1 performs a projected gradient descent to find the optimal q? ∈ Q (11). It starts
with an initial coverage q1 ∈ Q, and the corresponding shift α1 = q−1(q1). At step k, it calculates
the gradient ∇rev(qk), by solving the linear-system in Eq. (16). To solve this linear-system, we need
to calculate Jq(αk)
> and ∇revshift(αk). This can be done in O(n2m) steps if we have αk = q−1(qk)
(see Remark 5.3). Therefore, the algorithm requires a “good” approximation of α at each step, it
maintains this by “updating” the previous approximation αk−1 using Algorithm 2 to approximately
solve the optimal-shift problem (15).
After calculating ∇rev(qk), it takes a gradient step and projects the current iterate on Q in
O((nm)ω) time (Section 5.2), where ω is the fast matrix multiplication coefficient. It takes roughly
O(1/ε2) steps to obtain an ε-accurate solution, and then returns its current shift α ≈ α?. We can
bound the error introduced by the approximation of αk at each step by ensuring that Algorithm 2
has sufficient accuracy. In particular, if it is O(ε2) accurate we can prove that Algorithm 1 converges
in O˜(1/ε2) steps.
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Next, we give the details of the projecting on Q and calculating the gradient ∇rev.
5.1 Calculating and Bounding ∇rev(·)
We fix the shift of one advertiser i ∈ [n] for each type j ∈ [m]. Let Jq(α) be the Jacobian of the
vectorized coverage, vec(q(α)) ∈ R(n−1)m, with respect to the vectorized shift, vec(α) ∈ R(n−1)m.
Then, Jq(α) is a (n− 1)m× (n− 1)m matrix
Jq(α) =

∂q11(α)
α11
. . . ∂q11(α)α(n−1)1
. . . ∂q11(α)α(n−1)m
∂q21(α)
α11
. . . ∂q21(α)α(n−1)1
. . . ∂q21(α)α(n−1)m
...
...
. . .
...
...
∂q(n−1)1(α)
α11
. . .
∂q(n−1)1(α)
α(n−1)1
. . .
∂q(n−1)1(α)
α(n−1)m
 .
To obtain ∇rev(q), we use the fact that Jq(α) is always invertible (Lemma 5.2). Given α = q−1(δ)
for some δ ∈ [0, 1]n×m, we can calculate ∇rev(δ) by solving
∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], ∂revshift(α)
∂αij
=
∑
k∈[n]
∂rev(α)
∂qkj
∂qkj
αij
.
Or equivalently by solving the linear-system in Eq. (16).
Remark 5.1. Jq(α) is invertible iff we fix the shift αij of one advertiser i ∈ [n] for each type
j ∈ [m]. Intuitively, if we increase the αij for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] by the same amount, then q
remains invariant. This implies that each row of Jq(α) has 0 sum, or that Jq(α) is not invertible.
Lemma 5.2. (Jacobian is invertible). For all α ∈ R(n−1)×m, if all advertisers have non-zero
coverage for all types j ∈ [m], then Jq(α) ∈ R(n−1)·m×(n−1)·m is invertible.
Proof. The coverage remains invariant if the bids of all advertisers are uniformly shifted for any
given user type j. Therefore, for all j ∈ [m] we have∑
t∈[n]
∂qij
∂αtj
= 0. (21)
Since, increasing the shift αij , does not increase the coverage qkj for any k 6= i, we have that
∂qkj
∂αij
≤ 0 and ∂qij
∂αij
≥ 0. (22)
Now, from Equation (21) we have
∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], ∂qij
∂αij
=
∑
t∈[n]\{i}
∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αtj
∣∣∣∣. (23)
Further since the n-th advertiser has non-zero coverage, i.e., there is non-zero probability that
advertiser n bids higher than all other advertisers, changing αnj must affect all other advertisers.
In other words, for all i ∈ [n− 1] ∂qij∂αnj 6= 0. Using this we have,
∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], ∂qij
∂αij
>
∑
t∈[n−1]\{i}
∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αtj
∣∣∣∣. (24)
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(b) Correlation Among Keywords. The axes depict
keywords, reordered to emphasize their correlation.
A pair of keywords is colored white if it shares at
least 2 advertisers. Each block can be interpreted
as category of keyword (e.g., Science or Travel).
Figure 2
By observing that qij , on user type j, is independent of the αst, of any user type t such that t 6= j,
i.e.,
∀ i, s ∈ [n], j, t ∈ [m], s.t. j 6= t, ∂qij
∂αst
= 0, (25)
and using Equation (23), we get that the Jacobian, Jq(α) is strictly diagonally dominant. Now, by
the properties of strictly dominant matrices it is invertible.
Remark 5.3. For all i, s ∈ [n] such that i 6= s, qij is independent of αst (25). Therefore, that
Jacobian Jq(α) is sparse. and the linear-system in Eq. (16) can be solved in O(n
ωm) steps, where
ω is the fast matrix multiplication coefficient.
5.2 Projection on the Constraint Polytope (Q)
Given any point q ∈ [0, 1]n×m, by determining the constraints it violates, we can express the
projection on the constraint polytope Q, as a quadratic program with equality constraints. Using
this we can construct a projection oracle projQ, which given a point q ∈ [0, 1]n×m projects it onto
Q in O((nm)ω) arithmetic operations, where ω is the fast matrix multiplication coefficient.
6 Empirical Study
We evaluate our approach empirically on the Yahoo! A1 dataset [53]. We vary the strength of
the fairness constraint for all advertisers, find an optimal fair mechanism F using Algorithm 1
and compare it against the optimal unconstrained (and hence potentially unfair) mechanism M,
which is given by Myerson [37]. We first consider the impact of the fairness constraints on the
revenue of the platform. Let revN denote the revenue of mechanism N . We report the revenue
ratio κM,F := revF/revM. Note that the revenue of F can be at most that of M, as it solves a
constrained version of the same problem; thus κM,F ∈ [0, 1].
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(b) Fairness and Revenue. We report the revenue ratio
revM,F between the fair (F) and the unconstrained (M)
mechanisms.
Figure 3: The x-axis represents fairness constraint ` (lower bound). Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
We then consider the impact of the fairness constraints on the advertisers. Towards this, we
consider the distribution of winners among advertisers in an auction given by M and an auction
given by F . We report the total variation distance dTV (M,F) := 1/2
∑n
i=1 |
∑m
j=1 qij(M)−qij(F)| ∈
[0, 1] between the two distributions, as a measure of how much the winning distribution changes
due to the fairness constraints.
Lastly, we consider the fairness of the resultant mechanism F . To this end, we measure selection
lift (slift) achieved by F , slift(F) := mini∈[n],j∈[m](qij/1−qij) ∈ [0, 1]. Where slift(F) = 1, represents
perfect fairness among the two user types.
6.1 Dataset
We use the Yahoo! A1 dataset [53], which contains bids placed by advertisers on the top 1000
keywords on Yahoo! Online Auctions between June 15, 2002 and June 14, 2003. The dataset has
10475 advertisers, and each advertiser places bids on a subset of keywords; there are approximately
2 · 107 bids in the dataset.
For each keyword k, let Ak be the set of advertisers that bid on it. We infer the distribution of
valuation of an advertiser for a keyword by the bids they place on the keyword. In order to retain
sufficiently rich valuation profiles for each advertiser, we remove advertisers who place less than
1000 bids on k or whose valuations have variance lower than 3 · 10−3 from Ak, and then those who
win the auction less than 5% of the time. This retains more than 1.5 · 107 bids.
The actual keywords in the dataset are anonymized; hence, in order to determine whether two
keywords k1 and k2 are related, we consider whether they share more that one advertiser, i.e.,
Ak1 ∩Ak2 > 1. This allows us to identify keywords that are related (see Figure 2(b)), and hence for
which spillover effects may be present as described in [34]. Drawing that analogy, one can think of
each keyword in the pair as a different type of user for which the same advertisers are competing,
and the goal would be for the advertiser to win an equal proportion of each user.
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Figure 4: Effect of Fairness on Advertisers. The x-axis represents fairness constraint ` (lower
bound). We report the total variation distance, dTV (M,F), between the distribution of winners
in ads allocated by the fair (F) and the unconstrained (M) mechanism. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
There are 14, 380 such pairs. However, we observe that spillover does not affect all keyword
pairs (see Figure 2(a)). To test the effect of imposing fairness constrains in a challenging setting,
we consider only the auctions which are not already fair; in particular there are 3282 keyword pairs
which are less than ` = 0.3 fair.
6.2 Experimental Setup
As we only consider pairs of keywords in this experiment, a lower bound constraint `11 = δ is
equivalent to an upper bound constraint u12 = 1 − δ. Hence, it suffices to consider lower bound
constraints. We set `i1 = `i2 = ` ∀ i ∈ [2], and vary ` uniformly from 0 to 0.5 , i.e., from the
completely unconstrained case (which is equivalent to Myerson’s action) to completely constrained
case (which requires each advertiser to win each keywords in the pair with exactly the same prob-
ability). We report κN ,M, dTV (N ,M), and slift(F) averaged over all auctions after 104 iterations
in Figure 3 and Figure 4; error bars represent the standard error of the mean over 104 iterations
and 3282 auctions respectively.
Remark 6.1. Computationally, we could consider more types (m). The bottleneck is empirical;
whether the dataset contains enough keywords with m overlapping advertisers for the experiment
to be meaningful. For m < 7 we get over 1000 such keywords sets, and observe results similar to
m = 2 case, losing less than 5% of the revenue with a TV-distance smaller than 0.05 even for the
setting with ` = 0.5.
6.3 Empirical Results
Fairness. Since the auctions are unbalanced to begin with, we expect the selection lift to increase
with the fairness constraint. We observe a growing trend in the selection lift, eventually achieving
perfect fairness for ` = 0.5.
Revenue Ratio. We do not expect to outperform the optimal unconstrained mechanism. However,
we observe that even in the perfectly balanced setting with ` = 0.5 our mechanisms lose less than
14
5% of the revenue.
Advertiser Displacement. Since the auctions are unbalanced to begin with, we expect TV-distance
to grow with the fairness constraint. We observe this growing trend in the TV-distance on lowering
the risk-difference. Even for zero risk-difference (` = 0.5) our mechanisms obtain a TV-distance
smaller than 0.05. We present a discussion of this result in Section C.
7 Proofs
7.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Let us introduce three Lagrangian multipliers, a vector αj ∈ Rn≥0, a vector βj ∈ Rn≥0 and
a continuous function γj(·) : supp(φj) → R≥0 ∀ j ∈ [m], for the lower bound, upper bound, and
single item constraints respectively. Then calculating the Lagrangian function we have
L :=
∑
j∈[m]
Pr
U
[j]
∑
i∈[n]
∫
supp(φj)
φijxij(φj)dfj(φj) +
∑
i∈[n]
j∈[m]
αij
(∫
supp(φj)
xij(φij)dfj(φj)− `ij
∑
t∈[m]
∫
supp(φt)
xit(φt)dft(φt)
)
+
∑
j∈[m]
∫
supp(φj)
γj(φj)
(
1−
∑
i∈[n]
xij(φij)
)
dfj(φj) −
∑
i∈[n]
j∈[m]
βij
(∫
supp(φj)
xij(φij)dfj(φj)− uij
∑
t∈[m]
∫
supp(φt)
xit(φit)dft(φt)
)
.
The second integral is well defined by from the continuity of γj(·) and monotonic nature of xj(·).
In order for the supremum of the Lagrangian over xij(·) ≥ 0 to be bounded, the coefficient of xij(·)
must be non-positive. Therefore we require that for all g ⊆ supp(φj), i ∈ [n], and j ∈ [m]∫
g
αij − βij + PrU [j]φij −
∑
t∈[m]
(αit`it − βituit)− γj(φj)dfj(φj) ≤ 0.
Since xij(·) and γj(·) are continuous, we can equivalently require for all φj , i ∈ [n], and j ∈ [m]
αij − βij + PrU [j]φij −
∑
t∈[m]
(αit`it − βituit)− γj(φj) ≤ 0.
If this holds, we can express the supremum of L as
sup
xij(·)≥0
L =
∑
j∈[m]
∫
supp(φj)
γj(φj)dfj(φj).
Now we can express the dual optimization problem as follows:
(Dual of the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem). For all j ∈ [m], find a optimal
αj ∈ Rn≥0, βj ∈ Rn≥0 and γj(·) : supp(φj)→ R≥0 for
min
αj≥0
βj≥0
γj(·)≥0
∑
j∈[m]
∫
supp(φj)
γj(φj)dfj(φj) (26)
s.t. αij − βij + PrU [j]φij −
∑
t∈[m]
(αit`it − βituit) ≤ γj(φj) ∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], φj . (27)
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Since the primal is linear in xij(·), and the constraints are feasible strong duality holds. Therefore,
the dual optimal is primal optimal.
For any feasible constraints we have for all i ∈ [n] ∑j∈[m] `ij ≤ 1 and ∑j∈[m] uij ≥ 1. Therefore
the coefficient of αij , 1 −
∑
j∈[m] `ij ≥ 0, and that of βij ,
∑
j∈[m] uij − 1 ≥ 0. Since α and β are
non-negative, a optimal solution to the dual is finite. Let α?, β? be a optimal solutions to the dual,
and x?ij(·) be a optimal solution to the primal. Fixing α and β to their optimal values α? and β?
in the dual, let us define new virtual valuations φ′ij , for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]
φ′ij := φij +
1
PrU [j]
(
α?ij − β?ij −
∑
t∈[m]
(α?it`it − β?ituit)
)
.
Then the leftover problem has only one Lagrangian multiplier, γj(·). Let γ′j(·) be the affine transfor-
mation of γj defined on virtual valuations, i.e., γ
′
j(φ
′
j) := γj(φj), then the problem can be expressed
as follows.
(Dual with shifted virtual valuations). For all j ∈ [m], find the optimal γ′j(·) : supp(φ′j)→ R≥0
for
min
γj(·)≥0
∑
j∈[m]
∫
supp(φj)
γj(φ
′
j)dfj(φ
′
j) (28)
s.t. Pr
U
[j]φ′ij ≤ γj(φ′j) ∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], φ′. (29)
This is the dual of the following unconstrained revenue maximizing problem. Myerson’s mechanism
is the revenue maximizing solution to the unconstrained optimization problem. Further, by linearity
and feasibility of constraints strong duality holds. Therefore the α′-shifted mechanism, for α′ =
1/PrU [j] ·
(
α?ij − β?ij +
∑
t∈[m](α
?
it`it − β?ituit)
)
is a optimal fair mechanism.
(Unconstrained primal for the infinite-dimensional fair advertising problem). For all
j ∈ [m], find the optimal allocation rule xj(·) : Rn → [0, 1]n for
max
xij(·)≥0
revM(x1, x2, . . . , xm)
s.t.
∑
i∈[n]
xij(φj) ≤ 1 ∀ j ∈ [m], φj ∈ supp(φj).
Further, Myerson’s mechanism is truthful if the distribution of valuations are regular and indepen-
dent. Since α-shifted mechanism applies a constant shift to all valuation, it follows under the same
assumptions that any α-shifted mechanism is also truthful, and therefore has a unique payment
rule defined by its allocation rule.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Supporting Lemmas. Towards the proof of Theorem 4.3 we require the following two Lemmas.
The first lemma shows that rev(·) is Lipschitz continuous. Its proof is presented in Section 7.3.
Lemma 7.1. (Revenue is Lipschitz). For all coverages q1, q2 ∈ Q, if assumptions (17), (18) and
(20) are satisfied, then
|rev(q1)− rev(q2)| ≤
(
µmaxρ
µminη
)
n2‖q1 − q2‖F 4. (30)
4We use ‖ · ‖F to denote the Frobenius norm.
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The next lemma is an algorithm to solve the optimal shift problem. Its proof is presented in
Section 7.4
Lemma 7.2. (An algorithm to solve the optimal shift problem). There is an algorithm
(Algorithm 2) which outputs α ∈ Rn×m such that if assumptions (17), (18) and (19) are satisfied,
then α is an ε-optimal solution for the optimal shift problem, i.e., L(α) < ε, in
log
(
mL(α1)
ε
)
n3(L+ n2µ2max)
(ηµmin)2
steps.
Where the arithmetic operations in each step are bounded by calculating ∇L once.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Starting from q0 ∈ Q, Algorithm 1 performs a projected gradient descent
on Q. Since Q is convex, the projection is contractive. In particular, for the optimal q? ∈ Q
∀ q, ‖projQ(q)− q?‖2 ≤ ‖q − q?‖2. (31)
It queries the shift αk ≈ q−1(qk) from Algorithm 2 at each step. This introduces some error ξ > 0
at each step, which we fix later in the proof.
Let zk+1 = qk + γ∇rev(qk) be the coverage at the k + 1-th gradient-step, and qk+1 = q(αk+1)
be the coverage obtained by querying αk ≈ q−1(projQ(qk+1)). Then, we have the following bound
on the error
‖projQ(zk+1)− qk+1‖22 ≤ ξ. (Error from Algorithm 2, 32)
We know that rev(·) is a concave function of q. Using the first-order condition of concavity at q?
and qk we have
‖zk+1 − q?‖22 = ||qk + γ∇rev(qk)− q?‖22
≤ ‖qk − q?‖22 + 2γ(rev(qk − rev(q?) + γ2‖∇rev(qk)‖22. (33)
Using the triangle inequality with Eq. (31) and (32) we get
‖qk+1 − q?‖22 = ‖qk+1 − projQ(zk+1) + projQ(zk+1)− q?‖22
≤ ‖zk+1 − q?‖22 + ξ (34)
(33)
≤ ‖qk–q?‖22 + 2γ(rev(qk)–rev(q?)) + γ2‖∇rev(qk)‖22 + ξ (35)
Expanding the above recurrence we get
‖qk+1 − q?‖22
(35)
≤ kξ + ‖q1 − q?‖22 +
∑k
i=1
γ2‖∇rev(qi)‖22
+ 2
∑k
i=1
γ(rev(qi)− rev(q?)). (36)
Substituting ‖qk+1 − q?‖22 ≥ 0, and ‖q1 − q?‖22 ≤ 1 we get
kξ + 1 + 2
∑
i∈[k]
γ(rev(qi)− rev(q?)) +
∑
i∈[k]
γ2‖∇rev(qi)‖22 ≥ 0.
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Replacing rev(qi) by its maximum, choosing ξ := G
2γ2, and using ‖∇rev(qi)‖2 ≤ G and k :=(√
2G/ε
)2
we get
rev(q?)−max
i∈[k]
(
rev(xi)
) ≤ 1 + kξ +G2∑i∈[k] γ2
2
∑
i∈[k] γ
≤ ε
At each step we perform a small update to qk and query αk, therefore, Algorithm 2 is always
warm-started, i.e., ‖zk+1 − qk‖22 < Gγ. Now, from Lemma 7.2 the total steps required to update α
are ∑k
i=1
log
(
mGγ/ξ
) · n3(L+ n2µ2max)(ηµmin)−2
= (
√
2G/ε)2 log
(
2mG/ε
) · n3(L+ n2µ2max)(ηµmin)−2
The sum of the total gradient steps by Algorithm 1, and the total gradient steps by all calls of
Algorithm 2 is
O
(
G2/ε2 log
(
2mG/ε
) · n3(L+ n2µ2max)(ηµmin)−2).
Using G = (µmaxρ/µminη) · n2 (from Lemma 7.1) we have that Algorithm 1 gets an ε-approximation
of optimal revenue in
O˜
(
n7 logm
ε2
(µmaxρ)
2
(µminη)4
(L+ n2µ2max)
)
steps.
Where O˜ hides log factors in n, ρ, η, µmax, 1/ε and 1/µmin.
7.3 Proof of Lemma 7.1
We use Lemma 7.3 and Lemma 7.4 in the proof of Lemma 7.1. The two lemmas split the Lipschitz
continuity of rev(·) into the Lipschitz continuity of revshift(·) and αij = q−1ij (·) respectively. Their
proofs are follow in Section 7.3.1 and Section 7.3.2 respectively.
Lemma 7.3. (Revenue is Lipschitz continuous in shifts). For all α ∈ R(n−1)×m, if pdf, fij(φ)
of the virtual valuations is bounded above by µmax, and φij is bounded above by ρ ∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m],
then revshift(α) is (µmaxρn
3
2 )-Lipschitz continuous.
Lemma 7.4. (Shifts is Lipschitz continuous in coverage). For all α, β ∈ R(n−1)×m, such that
qij(β+ t(α− β)) > η, if the probability density function, fij(·), of virtual valuations is bounded by
µmin and µmax ∀ t ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], then
‖α− β‖F <
√
n
ηµmin
‖q(α)− q(β)‖2.
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Let α, β ∈ R(n−1)×m be the shifts achieving q1 and q2 respectively. Then by
Lemma 7.3 and Lemma 7.4 we have
|rev(q(α))− rev(q(β))| Lemma 7.3≤ µmaxρn 32 ‖α− β‖F (37)
‖α− β‖F
Lemma 7.4
<
√
n
ηµmin
‖q(α)− q(β)‖2. (38)
By combining Equation (37) and Equation (38) we get the required result
|rev(q1)− rev(q2)|
(37),(38)
<
µmaxρ
µminη
n2‖q1 − q2‖2. (39)
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For all j, k ∈ [m], i ∈ [n− 1], s.t.j 6= k .
∂revshift, j(α)
∂αij
= Pr
U
[j]
∑
k 6=i
∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
6`=i,k
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy (41)
− Pr
U
[j]
∑
k 6=i
∫
supp(fkj)
yfkj(y)fij(y + αkj − αij)
∏
` 6=i,k
F`j(y + αkj − α`j)dy
∂revshift, j(α)
∂αik
= 0 (42)
Figure 5: Gradient of revshift,j(·). Equations from the proof of Lemma 7.3.
7.3.1 Proof of Lemma 7.3
Proof. We first consider the revenue for one user type j, revshift, j(α), and then combine the result
across all user type to show that revshift(α) is Lipschitz continuous. Formally, we define revshift, j(α)
as
revshift, j(α) :=
∑
i∈[n]
Pr
U
[j]
∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)
∏
k∈[n]\{i}
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy. (Revenue from type j, 40)
Then the total revenue revshift(α) is just a sum of revshift, j(α) for all user types
revshift(α) =
m∑
j=1
revshift, j(α).
We can express ∇revshift, j(α) as shown in Figure 5. We can observe that every term in the
gradient (Equation (41), Equation (42)) is a linear function of fij(·) and Fij(·) for some i ∈ [n] and
j ∈ [m]. Since, each term in the gradient (Equation (41)) involves at most 2n terms of the form of
Equation (43) for some i, k, ` ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m],∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
`6=i,k
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy. (43)
Bounding this term, for all i, k, ` ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] by µmaxρ would give us a bound on ∇revshift(α).
To this end, consider∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
6`=i,k
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy
∣∣∣∣ (18)≤ µmax∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)dy
∣∣∣∣ (Using Fij(·) ≤ 1)
(20)
≤ µmaxρ. (44)
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For all k ∈ [n], let terms t1(k) and t2(k) be defined as follows
t1(k) :=
∫
supp(fij)
yfij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
`6=i,k
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy (45)
t2(k) :=
∫
supp(fkj)
yfkj(y)fij(y + αkj − αij)
∏
`6=i,k
F`j(y + αkj − α`j)dy. (46)
Then rewriting the gradient, from Figure 5, we have∣∣∣∣∂revshift, j(α)∂αij
∣∣∣∣ = PrU [j] ∑
k∈[n−1]\{i}
(
t1(k)− t2(k)
)
(44)
≤ Pr
U
[j]
∑
k∈[n−1]\{i}
µmaxρ
≤ (n− 2) Pr
U
[j] ρµmax. (47)
Now calculating the Frobenius norm of revshift, j(α) we get
‖∇revshift, j(α)‖2F =
∑
i∈[n−1]
k∈[m]
∣∣∣∣∂revshift, j(α)∂αik
∣∣∣∣2
(42)
=
∑
i∈[n−1]
∣∣∣∣∂revshift, j(α)∂αij
∣∣∣∣2 (48)
(47)
≤ Pr
U
[j](n− 1)((n− 2)ρµmax)2. (49)
Now, we proceed to bound ∇revshift(α)
‖∇revshift(α)‖2F =
∑
i∈[n−1]
j∈[m]
∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈[m]
∂revshift, k(α)
∂αij
∣∣∣∣2
(42)
=
∑
i∈[n−1]
j∈[m]
∣∣∣∣∂revshift, j(α)∂αij
∣∣∣∣2
(49)
=
∑
j∈[m]
‖revshift, j(α)‖2F
≤ (n− 1)((n− 2)ρµmax)2
∑
j∈[m]
Pr
U
[j]
≤ (n− 1)((n− 2)ρµmax)2. (50)
Therefore, it follows that ‖∇revshift(α)‖F ≤ n 32 ρµmax.
7.3.2 Proof of Lemma 7.4
Technical Lemmas. We use the following lemmas in the proof of Lemma 7.4. The first lemma
is a lower bound on the derivative qij(α), and follows from assumptions (17) and (18).
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Lemma 7.5. (Lower bound of derivative of qij(α)). If for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] the probability
density function, fij(·), of virtual valuations is bounded below by µmin, and every advertiser has at
least η coverage on every type j ∈ [m], then the absolute value of each gradient ∣∣∂qij(α)∂αsj ∣∣ is lower
bounded by ηµmin, i.e., ∣∣∣∣∂qij(α)∂αsj
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ηµmin ∀ i, s ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], α ∈ Rn×m.
Proof. Each advertiser has at least η coverage on every type, i.e., we have for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]
qij(α) =
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)
∏
k∈[n]\{i}
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy ≥ η. (51)
Now considering
∂qij(α)
∂αsj
we get∣∣∣∣∂qij(α)∂αsj
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)fsj(y + αsj − αij)
∏
k 6=i,s
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy
∣∣∣∣
≥ µmin
∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)
∏
k 6=i,s
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy
∣∣∣∣ (Using fij(φij) ≥ µmin)
≥ µmin
∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)
∏
k 6=i
Fkj(y + αij − αkj)dy
∣∣∣∣ (Using Fij(φij) ≤ 1)
(51)
≥ ηµmin. (52)
In the next lemma we extend the lower bound to the directional derivative of qij(α).
Lemma 7.6. (Lower bound of directional derivative of qij(α)). Given a shift αj ∈ Rn−1,
tmax > 0, and a direction vector u ∈ Rn−1 , s.t. ‖u‖2 = 1, if the probability density function, fij(·),
of virtual valuations is bounded below by µmin and bounded above by µmax ∀ i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and
qij(tu+ αj) > η for all t ∈ [0, tmax], then for i ∈ argmaxk∈[n−1] |uk| and for all t ∈ [0, tmax]
sign(ui)
∂qij(tu+ αj))
∂t
>
ηµmin√
n
. (53)
Proof. Consider i ∈ argmaxk∈[n−1] |uk|. Advertiser i’s bids are being increased faster than or equal
to any other advertiser’s. Recalling that the shift of advertiser n, αij = 0 for all user types j ∈ [m],
using Equation (10) we can express qij(tu+ α) and its gradient as shown in Figure 6.
Since i ∈ argmaxk∈[n−1] |uk|, we have
|ui| ≥ |uk|
sign(ui)ui ≥ max(uk,−uk)
(ui − uk)sign(ui) > 0. (56)
Since ‖u‖2 =
∑
i∈[n−1] |ui|2 = 1, we can lower bound |ui|2, the maximum coordinate of u ∈ Rn−1
by magnitude by 1n−1 , i.e., |ui| ≥ 1/
√
n−1. Multiplying Equation (55) with sign(ui) and using
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For all i ∈ [n− 1] and j ∈ [m]
qij(tu+ α) =
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)Fnj(y + tui + αij)
∏
k 6=i,n
Fkj(y + t(ui − uk) + αij − αkj)dy (54)
∂qij(tu+ α)
∂t
= ui
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)fnj(y + tui + αij)
∏
k 6=i,n
Fkj(y + t(ui − uk) + αij − αkj)dy (55)
+ (ui−uk)
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)Fnj(y+tui+αij)
∑
k 6=i,n
fkj(y+t(ui−uk)+αij−αkj)
∏
` 6=i,k,n
F`j(y+t(ui − u`)+αij−α`j)dy
Figure 6: Directional Derivative of qij(·). Equations from the proof of Lemma 7.6.
Equation (56) and the fact that the integrals involved are positive to lower bound the equation we
get
sign(ui)
∂qij(tu+ αj)
∂t
(56)
≥ sign(ui)ui ∂qij
∂αnj
∣∣∣∣
αj+tu
Lemma 7.5≥ |ui|ηµmin
≥ ηµmin√
n− 1 (Using |ui| >
1/
√
n−1)
>
ηµmin√
n
.
Proof of Lemma 7.4. Consider a type j ∈ [m] and the corresponding shifts αj , βj ∈ Rn, where
αj , βj are the j-th columns of α and β respectively. Let u := αj − βj , then from Lemma 7.6 we
have ∃ i ∈ [n− 1] such that
∀ t ∈ [0, 1],
∣∣∣∣∂qij(tu+ βj)∂t
∣∣∣∣ > ηµmin. (57)
Consider this i, then from the fundamental theorem of calculus we have
‖qj(αj)− qj(βj)‖22 =
∑
k∈[n]
∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
∂qkj(tu+ βj)
∂t
dt
∣∣∣∣2
≥
∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
∂qij(tu+ βj)
∂t
dt
∣∣∣∣2
(57)
>
(ηµmin)
2
n
∣∣∣∣ ∫ 1
0
(tu+ βj)dt
∣∣∣∣
>
(ηµmin)
2
n
‖αj − βj‖22. (58)
Using Equation (58) for every type j ∈ [m] we get that ‖q(α)− q(β)‖F > (ηµmin)2/n · ‖α− β‖F .
7.4 Proof of Lemma 7.2
The following remark gives insight, allowing us to use a gradient-based algorithm to solve the
optimal shift problem.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm2(δ, α1, ξ, L, η, µmax, µmin)
Input: A target coverage δ ∈ [0, 1]n×m, an approximate shift α1 ∈ Rn×m, a constant ξ > 0 that
controls the accuracy, Lipschitz constant L > 0 of fij(·), the minimum coverage η > 0, and the
lower and upper bounds, µmin and µmax, of fij(·).
Output: An approximation α ∈ Rn×m of shifts for δ.
1: Initialize γ := (4nL+ 2n3µ2max)
−1
2: Initialize
T := log
(
mn3L(α1)/ε
) (L+n2µ2max)
(ηµmin)2
3: for t = 1,2,. . . ,T do
4: Compute ∇L(αt) := ∇[L1(αt), . . . ,Lm(αt)]
5: Update αt+1 := αt − γ∇L(αt)
6: end for
7: return α
Remark 7.7. We observe that ∇L = 2∑i,j(qij(α) − δij)∇qij(α) is a linear combination of the
rows, {∇qij}, of Jq(α). Since {∇qij(α)} are linearly independent, ∇L 6= 0 unless we are at the
global minimum where δ = q(α). This guarantees that L(·) does not have any saddle-points or
local-maxima, and that any local minimum is a global minimum.
Now, to get an efficient complexity with a gradient-based algorithm we want to avoid small gradients
“far” from the optimal. Lemma 7.8 shows that if L(α) greater than ε, then the Frobenius norm
‖L(α)‖F of L(α) is greater than
√
ε. The proof of Lemma 7.8 is provided in Section 7.4.1. The
proof of Lemma 7.8 is provided in Section 7.4.1.
Lemma 7.8. (Lower bounding ∇Lj(·)). Given αj ∈ Rn−1, such that Lj(αj) > ε and qij(αj) > η,
if the probability density function, fij(·), of virtual valuations is bounded below by µmin ∀ i ∈
[n], j ∈ [m], then ‖∇Lj(αj)‖2 > 2n−1
√
εηµmin.
Next, in Lemma 7.9 we show that the gradient, ∇L(α), is O(n(L+ n2µ2max))-Lipschitz contin-
uous. Therefore, at each step where L(α) ≥ ξ, we improve the loss by a factor of 1− βξ, where β
does not depend on ξ. This gives us a complexity bound of O(log 1/ε). The proof of Lemma 7.9 is
presented in Section 7.4.2.
Lemma 7.9. (Gradient of L(·) is Lipschitz). If the probability density function, fij(φ), of
the virtual valuations, φij is L-Lipschitz continuous and bounded above by µmax, then ∇Lj(αj) is
O(n(L+ n2µ2max))-Lipschitz.
Now, at each step, if the loss is greater than ξ, we get an improvement by a factor of 1−βξ, where
β does not depend on ξ. This gives us a complexity bound of O(log 1/ε).
Proof of Lemma 7.2. At each iteration of the algorithm we calculate ∇Lj(α) for all j ∈ [m], i.e.,
we calculate ∇L(α). We note that this bounds the arithmetic calculations at one iteration. We
recall from Equation (25) that the shift for one user type do not affect the coverage for the other.
Therefore we can independently find a optimal shift αj for all each user type j ∈ [m].
From Lemma 7.1 we have that Lj is O(n(L + n2µ2max))-Lipschitz continuous. Let L′ := O(n(L +
n2µ2max)), for brevity. We can get an upper bound to Lj(αk) from the first order approximation of
Lj at αk, further using the update rule αk+1 = αk − 1L′∇Lj(αk) we have
Lj(αk+1) ≤ Lj(αk)− 1
2L′
‖∇Lj(αk)‖22.
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Let λ := 2n−1ηµmin, then from Lemma 7.8 we have that ∇Lj(α) is lower bounded by
√Lj(αk)λ.
Using this to lower bound the gradient we get
Lj(αk)− Lj(αk+1) ≥ 1
2L′
‖∇Lj(αk)‖22
Lj(αk+1) ≤ Lj(αk)− Lj(αk)λ
2
2L′
.
By the above recurrence we get
Lj(αk) ≤ Lj(α0)
(
1− λ
2
2L′
)k
.
Setting k := log mL(α0)ε
−1
log
(
1− λ2
2L′
) we get that for all j ∈ [m], Lj(αk) < ε/m. Therefore
L(α) =
m∑
j=1
Lj(αj) < ε.
Substituting L′ = O(n(L+ n2µ2max)) we get that the algorithm outputs α, such that L(α) < ε in
log
(
mL(α1)
ε
)
n3(L+ n2µ2max)
(ηµmin)2
steps.
7.4.1 Proof of Lemma 7.8
In the proof of Lemma 7.8 we use Lemma 7.10, which shows that any linear combination of ∇qij(α)
for all i ∈ [n], with reasonably “large” weights is lower bounded. We note that Lemma 7.10 does
not follow from linear independence of ∇qij(α) ∀ i ∈ [n] (Lemma 5.2), because linear combinations
of linearly independent vectors can be arbitrary small while having “large” weights.
Lemma 7.10. Given x ∈ Rn−1 such that ‖x‖1 > 1, if for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m] the probability density
function, fij(·), of virtual valuations is bounded below by µmin, and qij(αj) > η coverage on every
user type j ∈ [m], then ∥∥∥∥ ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi∇qij(αj)
∥∥∥∥
2
>
ηµmin
n− 1 ∀ αj ∈ R
n−1. (59)
Proof. Without loss of generality consider a reordering of (x1, x2, . . . , xn), s.t. for some p ≤ n− 1
xi ≥ 0 ∀ i ≤ p (60)
xi < 0 ∀ i > p. (61)
Case A.
∑
i∈[p] xi < 1/2 :
We can replace x by −x, since this does not change the norm ∥∥∑i∈[n−1] xi∇qij(αj)∥∥2. Now
replacing p by (n− p− 1) we get case B.
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Case B.
∑
i∈[p] xi ≥ 1/2 :
The coverage remains invariant if the bids of all advertisers are uniformly shifted for any given user
type j. (α1j , α2j , . . . , αnj). Therefore we have for all i ∈ [n− 1]
∂qij(α)
∂αij
+
∑
k∈[n−1]\{i}
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
(21)
= −∂qij(α)
∂αnj
(62)
(22)
=
∣∣∣∣∂qij(α)∂αnj
∣∣∣∣
Lemma 7.5≥ ηµmax.
Calculating the weighted sum of Equation (63) over i ∈ [p] with weights xi we get∑
i∈[p]
xi
( ∑
k∈[n−1]
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
)
(63)
>
∑
i∈[p]
xiηµmin
>
ηµmin
2
.
On rearranging the LHS we get∑
k∈[n−1]
(∑
i∈[p]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
)
>
ηµmin
2
.
Therefore, by the pigeonhole principle on elements of the outer sum, ∃ k ∈ [n− 1], s.t.∑
i∈[p]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
≥ 1
n− 1
∑
k∈[n−1]
(∑
i∈[p]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
)
(63)
≥ ηµmin
2(n− 1) . (64)
From Equation (22) for all i ∈ [p] and k > p, ∂qij(α)∂αkj < 0 . Therefore, k ≤ p in Equation (64). From
this we get ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
=
∑
i∈[p]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
+
∑
i∈[n−1]\[p]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
(64)
≥ ηµmin
2(n− 1) +
∑
i∈[n−1]\[p]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
Lemma 7.5≥ ηµmin
2(n− 1) + ηµmin
∑
i∈[n−1]\[p]
(−xi)
(61)
≥ ηµmin
2(n− 1) . (65)
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Therefore, ∃ k ∈ [n− 1] such that ∑i∈[n−1] xi ∂qij(α)∂αkj > ηµmin. It follows that∥∥∥∥ ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi∇qij(α)
∥∥∥∥2
2
=
∑
t∈[m]
∑
k∈[n−1]
( ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkt
)2
(25)
=
∑
k∈[n−1]
( ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi
∂qij(α)
∂αkj
)2
(65)
≥
(
ηµmin
2(n− 1)
)2
(66)∥∥∥∥ ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi∇qij(α)
∥∥∥∥
2
≥ ηµmin
2(n− 1) .
Proof of Lemma 7.8. Since Lj(αj) ≥ ε, we have
Lj(αj) =
∑
i∈[n−1]
(δij − qij(αj))2 ≥ ε. (67)
Further, using
(∑
i ai
)2
=
∑
i a
2
i +
∑
i,k 2aiak we get
Lj(αj) =
∑
i∈[n−1]
(δij − qij(αj))2
≤
( ∑
i∈[n−1]
∣∣δij − qij(αj)∣∣)2. (68)
From these we have that∑
i∈[n−1]
|δij − qij(αj)|
(68),(67)
≥ √ε. (69)
Considering xi =
1√
ε
(δij − qij(αj)) we have
∑
i∈[n−1]
|xi| = 1√
ε
∑
i∈[n−1]
|δij − qij(α)| > 1.
From Lemma 7.10 we have ∥∥∥∥ ∑
i∈[n−1]
xi∇qij(αj)
∥∥∥∥
2
Lemma 7.10≥ ηµmin
n− 1∥∥∥∥ ∑
i∈[n−1]
2(δij − qij(αj))∇qij(αj)
∥∥∥∥
2
≥ 2√εηµmin
n− 1 .
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For all distinct i, k, t in [n]
∂2qij
∂αij∂αij
=
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)
∑
k 6=i
f ′kj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
` 6=k,i
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy (70)
+
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)
∑
k 6=i
fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∑
6`=i,k
f`j(y + αij − α`j)
∏
h6=`,k,i
Fhj(y + αij − αhj)dy
∂2qij
∂αkj∂αkj
=
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)f
′
kj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
` 6=k,i
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy (71)
∂2qij
∂αkj∂αij
=
∂2qij
∂αij∂αkj
= −
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)f
′
kj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
6`=k,i
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy (72)
−
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∑
6`=k,i
f`j(y + αij − α`j)
∏
h 6=`,k,i
Fhj(y + αij − αhj)dy
∂2qij
∂αkj∂αtj
=
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)ftj(y + αij − αtj)
∏
6`=k,i
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy. (73)
Figure 7: Hessian of qij(·). Equations from proof of Lemma 7.11.
7.4.2 Proof of Lemma 7.9
In order to show that the loss L(·) is O(n(L + n2µ2max))-Lipschitz continuous, we first show that
∇qij is 2n(L + nµ2max)-Lipschitz continuous. To this end, we show that the elements of ∇2qij are
bounded (Lemma 7.11), and then use Lemma 7.12 (Corollary 1.2 in [48]) to bound the magnitudes
of the eigen-values.
Lemma 7.11. Given αj ∈ Rn, if pdf, fij(φ) of the virtual valuations, φij is L-Lipschitz continuous
and bounded above by µmax, then elements in the main diagonal of the Hessian, ∇2qij(αj) are
bounded in absolute value by n(L+ nµ2max), and all other elements are bounded in absolute value
by L+ nµ2max, i.e.,
∀ i ∈ [n], ∂
2qij
∂αij∂αij
≤ n(L+ nµ2max)
∀ k, t ∈ [n], k 6= i or t 6= i, ∂
2qij
∂αkj∂αtj
≤ L+ nµ2max.
Proof. Consider the Hessian of qij(αj) in Figure 7, which follows from differentiating Equation 10
with respect to αj , where αj is the j-th column of α. We note that
qij
αst
= 0 for any t 6= j, for all
i, s ∈ [n] and j, t ∈ [m], and so we only need to calculate the gradient with respect to αj .
We can observe that for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] every term in the Hessian is linear function of
f ′ij(y), fij(y) and Fij(y). In particular each term in the Hessian is a sum of the following terms, for
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some combinations of i, k, ` ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)f`j(y + αij − α`j)
∏
h6=`,k,i
Fhj(y + αij − αhj)dy (74)
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)f
′
kj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
`6=k,i
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy. (75)
Each term along the diagonal of the Hessian (Equation (70)),
∂2qij
∂αij∂αij
, is a combination of (n− 1)
terms of the form Equation (74), and n2 terms of the form Equation (75). All other terms in the
Hessian contain at most n terms of the form Equation (75), and 1 term of the form Equation (74).
Bounding these terms for all i, k, ` ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m] by µ2max would give us a bound on terms of
the Hessian, which in turn gives bounds on the eigen-values of the Hessain.
To this end, recall that for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m], and y ∈ supp(fij)
0 < fij(y) ≤ µmax, (76)
0 ≤ Fij(y) ≤ 1, (77)
|f ′ij(y)| < L, (78)∫
supp(fij)
fij(z)dz = 1. (79)
We can now bound Equation (74) and Equation (75) as follows
(74)
(76),(77)
≤ µ2max
∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)dy
∣∣∣∣ (79)≤ µ2max, (80)
(75)
(78),(77)
≤ L
∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)dy
∣∣∣∣ (79)≤ L. (81)
Now we have for all k, i ∈ [n], s.t., k 6= i∣∣∣∣ ∂2qij∂αij∂αij
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣∑
k 6=i
(75) +
∑
k 6=i
∑
`6=i,k
(74)
∣∣∣∣
(80),(81)
≤ (n− 1)(L+ (n− 2)µ2max) (Using triangle inequality)
≤ n(L+ nµ2max) (82)∣∣∣∣ ∂2qij∂αkj∂αkj
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣(75)∣∣ (81)≤ L (83)∣∣∣∣ ∂2qij∂αkj∂αtj
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣(74)∣∣ (80)≤ µ2max (84)∣∣∣∣ ∂2qij∂αkj∂αij
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∂2qij∂αij∂αkj
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣(75) + ∑
` 6=k,i
(74)
∣∣∣∣ .
(80),(81)
≤ L+ (n− 2)µ2max (85)
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Lemma 7.12. (Corollary 1.2 in [48]) For any matrix A ∈ Rn×n, and any eigen-value λ ∈ R of A,
λ ≤ max
i∈[n]
∑
j∈[n]
|Aij |.
We refer the reader to [48] for a proof of the above lemma.
Proof of Lemma 7.9. To show that ∇Lj(αj) is Lipschitz continuous, we show that qij(αj) is
Lipschitz continuous, then use the fact that ∇qij(αj) is Lipschitz continuous from Lemma 7.12,
and that δj and qij(·) have bounded sums if the loss is greater than ε. To this end we recall
Lj(αj) :=
∑
i∈[n−1]
(δij − qij(αj))2
∇Lj(αj) = −2
∑
i∈[n−1]
(δij − qij(αj))∇qij(αj)
Consider the following term for some i, k ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]
t(k) :=
∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)fkj(y + αij − αkj)
∏
`6=k,i
F`j(y + αij − α`j)dy. (86)
Now we can express
∣∣ ∂qij
∂αij
∣∣ and ∣∣ ∂qij∂αkj ∣∣ ∀ i, k ∈ [n] and k 6= i as follows∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αij
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∑
k∈[n]\{i}
t(k)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (n− 1) · ∣∣t(i)∣∣
≤ (n− 1)µmax ·
∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)dy
∣∣∣∣ ( Using fij(φij) ≤ µmax and Fij(φij) ≤ 1)
(79)
≤ (n− 1)µmax. (Using
∫
supp(fij)
fij(z)dz = 1, 87)∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αkj
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣t(k)∣∣
(77)
≤ µmax
∣∣∣∣ ∫
supp(fij)
fij(y)dy
∣∣∣∣ (Using fij(φij) ≤ µmax and Fij(φij) ≤ 1)
(79)
≤ µmax. (Using
∫
supp(fij)
fij(z)dz = 1, 88)
Now we can show that the gradient of qij(αj) is bounded, i.e., qij(αj) is Lipschitz continuous. For
this consider ‖∇qij(αj)‖
‖∇qij(αj)‖22 =
∑
k∈[n]
( ∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αkj
∣∣∣∣2 )
≤
∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αij
∣∣∣∣2 + ∑
k∈[n]\{i}
( ∣∣∣∣ ∂qij∂αkj
∣∣∣∣2 )
(87),(88)
≤ (n− 1)2µ2max + nµ2max
≤ n2µ2max. (89)
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Since qij(αj) and δij represent the probabilities of advertisers winning they sum to 1. Therefore,
for all user type j ∈ [m], their sum is bounded by 1, i.e., ∑i∈[n] qij(αj) ≤ 1 and ∑i∈[n] δij ≤ 1.
Using the triangle inequality we get
n−1∑
i=1
|δij − qij(αj)| ≤
n−1∑
i=1
(
|δij |+ |qij(αj)|
)
≤ 2. (90)
We represent the Hessian ∇2qij(αj) by H(αj) for brevity. Then the Hessian of L(·) is
∇2Lj(αj) = 2 ·
n−1∑
i=1
∇qij(αj)∇qij(αj)> −
n−1∑
i=1
(δij − qij(αj)) ·H(αj). (91)
We know from Lemma 7.12 that the eigen-values of H(αj) are bounded in absolute value by
2n(L+ nµ2max). We also know that the only non-zero eigen-value of vv
> for any vector v is ‖v‖22.
Let ‖X‖? be the spectral-norm of matrix X, which is defined as the maximum singular value of
X. Then, since singular-values are absolute values of the eigen-values the spectral norm of H(αj)
and vv> are bounded. Specifically,
‖H(αj)‖?
Lemma 7.12≤ 2n(L+ nµ2max) (92)
‖qij(αj)qij(αj)>‖? ≤ ‖qij(αj)‖22
(89)
≤ n2µ2max. (93)
Now, we use the sub-additivity of the spectral-norm (represented as ‖ · ‖?)
‖A+B‖? ≤ ‖A‖? + ‖B‖?. (Sub-additivity of ‖ · ‖?, 94)
This gives us the following
‖∇2Lj(αj)‖?
(94)
≤ 2
∑
i∈[n−1]
‖∇qij(αj)∇qij(αj)>‖? + (δij − qij(αj))‖H(αj)‖?
(92),(93)
≤ 2
∑
i∈[n−1]
n2µ2max + 4n(L+ nµ
2
max)
∑
i∈[n−1]
(δij − qij(αj))
(90)
≤ 2n3µ2max + 4n(L+ nµ2max).
Therefore, ‖∇2Lj(αj)‖? ≤ O(n(L+n2µ2max)), and the eigen-values of ‖∇2Lj(αj)‖? are bounded in
absolute value by O(n(L+ n2µ2max)).
8 Limitations and Future Work
This work leaves several interesting directions open. On the technical side, it would be interesting
to improve Theorem 4.3 by weakening the assumptions on the distributions, or by deriving better
complexity bounds in terms of ε or n. Although our algorithm works for intersectional types,
it considers a separate constraint for each intersection. Since there can be exponentially many
intersections compared to the types, it would be important to improve the run-time in this setting.
Exploring the utility lost from the advertiser’s perspective, and potential ways of bounding it would
also be of interest. Further, it would be relevant to extend our framework to the (non-truthful)
general second price auction [19,50], which is used to auction multiple ad slots together.
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From a practical standpoint, a natural problem is that advertisers run their campaigns at
different times; while an ad campaign is running on the platform, several other campaigns start
and finish. Our framework does not account for this. Further, we do not ensure that users of
different types derive similar value from an ad. An advertiser could intentionally design an ad
to appeal to a specific type, and then, even though the ad receives a balanced coverage, it could
generate biased value for users [45].
Finally on the empirical side, testing our framework in the field and studying how the constraints
affect user satisfaction, and the profile of ads they see would be important.
9 Conclusion
We initiate a formal study of designing mechanisms for online ad auctions that can ensure ad-
vertisements are not shown disproportionately to different populations. This is especially relevant
for ads for employment opportunities, housing, and other regulated markets where biases in the
recipient population can be illegal and/or unethical. As has been shown recently, existing plat-
forms suffer from various spillover effects that result in such biased distributions. Our approach
places constraints on the allocations achieved by an ad across different sub-populations in order
to ensure balanced exposure of the content. It can be used flexibly placing constraints on some
or all advertisers, across some or all sub-populations, and varying the tightness of the constraint
depending on the level of fairness desired.
We present a truthful mechanism which attains the optimal revenue while satisfying the con-
straints necessary to attain such fairness, and present an efficient algorithm for finding this mech-
anism given the advertiser properties and fairness constraints. Empirically, we observe that our
mechanisms can satisfy fairness constraints at a minor loss to the revenue of the platform, even
when the constraints ensure it attains perfect fairness. Hence, fairness is not necessarily at odds
with maximizing the platform’s ad revenue. Furthermore, we show empirically that advertisers are
not significantly impacted with respect to their winning percentages – the sub-populations their
ads are shown to change to be fair, but overall they are still reach a similar number of users.
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A A Simple Example of Competitive Spillover
In this section we discuss the example of competitive spillover presented the introduction more
concretely.
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Let the two advertisers have an equal budget of $30. Both of them place a bid of $1, if they
target the current user and otherwise place a bid of $0. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume
that men and women visit the platform alternately. Consider an auction mechanism that shows the
ad of the highest bidder. If there is more than one bidder with the same highest bid, the auction
mechanism chooses one uniformly at random.
Whenever a man visits the webpage, the second advertiser places a bid of $1, while the first
advertiser places a bid of $0. Therefore, the mechanism always shows the second advertiser’s
ad.Whereas when a women visits the platform, both the advertisers place a bid of $1, and one of
them shows the advertisement with a 50% probability.
Consider the point when 40 users have visited the platform, 20 men and 20 women. The second
advertiser has shown 20 ads to men, and 10 ads to women. Whereas the first advertiser has only
displays 10 ads to females. Having shown 30 ads, the second advertiser has finished the budget,
and leaves the auction, while the first advertiser stays till another 20 women visit the platform.
In such a situation, the second advertiser who meant the ad to be unbiased among users, ends
up under-representing women in the viewers of the ad.
B Revenue is Non-Concave in α
Consider two advertisers and one user type with f11(x) = e
−x and f21(x) = e−x. We fix the shift
of advertiser 2 to 0, and consider a positive shift α ≥ 0 of advertiser 1. Then
revshift(α) =
∫
supp(f11)
yf11(y)F21(y + α)dy +
∫
supp(f21)
yf21(y)F11(y − α)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
ye−y(1− e−(y+α))dy +
∫ ∞
α
ye−y(1− e−(y−α))dy
= 1 + 1/2 · (α+ 1)e−α.
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(a) Coverage as a Function of Shift. (Non-Convex)
Coverage for one of the two advertisers with exponen-
tially distributed bids, on two user types. We vary the
shift of one of the advertisers and report its coverage
as a function of the shift.
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(b) Loss as a Function of Shifts. (Non-Convex) The
loss L(α), for two advertisers with exponential valua-
tions, and δ = (0.5, 0.5). We vary the shift of one of
the advertisers and report its coverage as a function
of the shift.
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Differentiating revshift we can observe it is not a concave function of the shift α (see Figure 9(a)).
Indeed if we consider d
2revshift
dα2
= 1/2 · (α+ 1)e−α, it is positive for all α > 1. Consider the coverage
q(α) of advertiser 1
q(α) =
∫
supp(f11)
yf11(y)F21(y + α)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
e−y(1− e−(y+α))dy
= 1− 1/2 · e−α.
Similarly we can observe that q is not a convex function of α (see Figure 8(a)). Using q(α) to
formulate the loss L(α) we can easily observe that it is non-convex as well (see Figure 8(b)). Let
us re-parameterize the revenue revshift in terms of q as rev(·). Then we have
rev(1− q) = 1 + (1− q)(1− log(2− 2q))) (95)
d2rev(q)
dq2
=
−1
1− q ≤ 0. (Using q < 1)
We can observe that revenue is a concave function of the coverage (see Figure 9(b)).
C Why Is the TV-Distance Small?
To calculate the TV-distance we consider the distribution of winners selected by the auction mech-
anism, i.e., the distribution of the number of users an advertiser reaches. This distribution is
different from coverage which separates the audience by their types. We report the total variation
distance
dTV (M,F) := 1/2
n∑
i=1
|
m∑
j=1
qij(M)− qij(F)| ∈ [0, 1] (96)
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(a) We report the total revenue as a function of the shift.
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(b) We report the total revenue as a function of the coverage.
Figure 9: Revenue as a Function of Coverage and Shift. Total revenue for two advertisers with
exponentially distributed bids, on two user types. We vary the shift of one of the advertisers.
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between the two distributions, as a measure of how much the winning distribution changes due to
the fairness constraints.
Consider the distribution of advertiser i’s coverage as the vector {qij(M)}j∈[m] ∈ [0, 1]m. Its
projection on the perfectly-fair polytope is
1
m
( m∑
j=1
qij(M)
)
· (1, 1, · · · , 1) ∈ [0, 1]n. (97)
Since the coverage is uniform, it satisfies the perfect fairness constraints. Further, using Eq. 96 we
can observe that this projection has a 0 total variation distance dTV to {qij(M)}j∈[m].
If the solution qij(F) of the optimal fair mechanism is close to this projection, then the resulting
dTV (M,F) is small. Moving the coverage qij(F) away from the projection involves a trade-off
between increasing the total change in coverage, and decreasing the change for some types the
advertiser values more.
Therefore, if the average bid of an advertiser does not vary significantly between the types, then
qij(F) is close to the projection. Importantly, this does not imply that the coverages qij(M) of
the unconstrained mechanism are balanced. To gain some intuition, consider two advertisers with
similar budgets, but one advertiser places a bid of 1 + ε for men and 1 − ε for women, while the
other places a bid of 1 for men and women. Even though the first advertiser’s bid for men is only
2ε higher than their bid for women, they would only reach men, i.e., q1 = (1, 0). Whereas, the
platform only loses just ε fraction of its revenue by changing q1 to its projection (1/2, 1/2).
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